institutions would result from the normal and legitimate processes of the system, such as from elections in a democracy; such a situation does not conform to most intuitive conceptions of revolution.
This definition includes as revolutions the French, Russian, Nazi, Meiji, Chinese , Cuban, and Mexican revolutions, as well as successful revitalization movements, and the transformation which occurred in China from the disintegration of the later Han dynasty to the stabilization of the T'ang dynasty. It Overholt, 1977) . All of these are important, but the creation, maintenance, and destruction of political organizations is the central theme of revolution and the central preoccupation of revolutionaries. Discontent without organization is a mere school of guppies in an Establishment sea, and brilliant military strategy not backed by a disciplined organization is just so many squirts of strategic ink. [495] An organizational conflict perspective on revolution integrates a variety of previous, partially contradictory perspectives. A revolutionary (or governmental) Figure 1 ).
THE PARTICIPANTS IN REVOLUTION
A revolutionary party in a large and complex society must eventually face organized, relatively skillful opposition with substantial conflict resources. It must therefore be able to cope with heavy decision loads and high need for coordination. It needs an &dquo;ability to adapt itself immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle&dquo; (Lenin, 1943: 162). These requirements imply emphasis on a small central organization with extremely concentrated organizational resources. Such an organization also maximizes its ability to remain secret and its ability to manipulate other organizations (Lenin, 1943: 116-117) . The successful revolutionary organization requires extremely high internal cohesion, access to manipulable mass organizations, and good strategic resources and leadership. [496] The organizational requirements of revolution imply heavy emphasis on acquisition of those resources necessary to organization : visible and salient goals (hereafter &dquo;motivational resources&dquo;), available time, communications, organizational skills, and autonomy (Overholt, 1974; 1972: ch (Overholt, 1973 (Moore, 1965: 14) . The Philippine Huks failed for lack of revolutionary organizational strategy as well as for lack of resources; by emphasizing size rather than discipline, and social harmony rather than struggle, they enfeebled themselves (Overholt, 1973 (Huntington, 1968) (Lenin, 1943: 116 (Lenin, 1943: 121 (Lenin, 1943: 28) . Every large organization requires some definition of its basic purposes and activities (Schurmann, 1966: 18-19n.) .
The more esoteric the activities of the organization, the less it can rely on the general education provided by the community, the greater the need for internal &dquo;orientation.&dquo; Bolshevism's radical split from the community, and the need to ensure an extraordinary degree of reliability, greatly increase its dependence on an official doctrine. [Selznick, 1952: 36] Ideology is a crucial source of organizational resources and strategies, and of conflict resources and strategies, and is thus a crucial determinant of the likelihood and outcome of revolutionary struggle.
Ideology provides a potentially revolutionary group with organizational resources. An appropriate ideology makes putative sources of discontent more visible and salient. By explaining the social or political sources of discontent, ideology [500] transforms individual problems into group problems; an aggregate whose problems have common social or political roots is provided with bases of identity and solidarity (Apter, 1967: 46). To the extent that an ideology displaces earlier beliefs, it may increase the autonomy of an aggregate by disintegrating old bases of identity and solidarity and obligation. It also increases autonomy by providing assurance that the revolution cannot fail, because God or history assures success (Johnson, 1966: 84-85; Hoffer, 1963: ch. I; Toch, 1965: 11) . Ideology provides an aggregate with common categories of thought and a common language (Schurmann, 1966: 58ff.) (Lenin, 1943: ch. 5 ). It typically contains rules for allocating authority within the organization, designates legitimate interpreters of the ideology, and delimits membership in the group. The need for interpretation of the ideology justifies a leadership role for a charismatic leader and for an intellectual elite which is otherwise alien to the discontented masses (Bittner, 1963: 937) . Different facets of ideology provide organizational leaders with tools for mobilizing and manipulating support from several crucial groups. In Schurmann's ( 1966: 73) terms, pure ideology, which states values, can be used to mobilize mass support; practical ideology, which states norms of behavior, can be used to mobilize support from &dquo;the line component of the middle tier of organization&dquo;; and nonideolog- [501] ical professional values can be used to mobilize professional staff. Ideology provides rules for conflict and debate within the organization; for instance, Leninism prescribes self-criticism and mutual criticism but proscribes attacks on the party, and encourages policy discussions but prohibits organized factionalism. The need for doctrinal purity (a need derived from the training of the intellectuals and the characteristic anomie of sections of the masses) makes ideology into a (two-edged) tool which leaders can use against potential or actual opponents by accusing them of heresy (Bittner, 1963 Gillis, 1970 (Brinton, 1965; Davies, 1962; Taylor, 1954; AlRoy, 1967 (Schurmann, 1966: xli). In addition to augmenting the technical resources for organization, social and economic modernization frequently augment the visibility and salience of potential sources of discontent. Modernization produces expectations that cannot always be satisfied (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968 Gurr, , 1970 , produces disorienting mobility both upward and downward (Lewis, 1963; Hollingshead et al., 1954) , mobilizes people out of old beliefs and norms before it provides them with new ones (Olson, 1963; Deutsch, 1968) , and produces groups of people who cannot tolerate their own identities and seek new identities through violence (Marx, n.d.: 708-709; Hoffer, 1963: 13, 42, 62; Komhauser, 1959: 108-109; Arendt, 1968: 172-175; Fromm, 1967: 45) . Revolutionaries often come from areas or groups whose conditions are improving (Tocqueville, 1955: 175-177; Pye, 1956: 130ff.; AlRoy, 1967: 419) and at least sometimes tend to be people who assume that they can do better in life than their parents (Pye, 1956 As it happens, studies of top leaders' personalities provide few useful generalizations (Wolfenstein, 1965 (Wolfenstein, , 1967 A crucial factor in the adoption of a revolutionary ideology is the accessibility of such an ideology. Revolutionaries worry a [509] great deal about mass &dquo;consciousness,&dquo; and practical revolutionaries universally acknowledge that it does not arise spontaneously. Lenin (1943: 40) maintained that the labor movement could never work out an independent ideology for itself, and cites Kautsky's argument that socialism arises from bourgeois science rather than from class struggle. Mao (1954: 99) complained that &dquo;Wherever the Red Army goes, it finds the masses cold and reserved; only after propaganda and agitation do they slowly rouse themselves.&dquo; Not all idea systems which satisfy the psychological requirements are revolutionary ideologies. A quietist religious movement may provide a Sermon on the Mount with the requisite supreme principle and deduced norms, together with assurance of salvation and rebirth through repentence (violence turned inward against the self) and participation in a historic enterprise. Accessibility seems to determine whether the accepted idea systems will be revolutionary ideologies or religions or something else. Put bluntly, the adopted idea system may be the one which arrives on the scene first, provided that it meets certain minimum requirements. What are those requirements?
The (Benda, 1966) (Riezler, 1943) . Such attitudes make the government an object to be captured rather than an active force defending itself. Neutrality is as worthy of study as commitment.
STRATEGIES OF REVOLUTION II: THE PRECIPITANTS OF REVOLUTION
One of the few points of consensus in the literature on revolution is the distinction between-on one hand-the underlying tension, struggle, strain, or source of discontent which constitutes the basic social or political conflict and-on the other hand-the unpredictable event which ignites active revolutionary conflict. It is generally believed that precipitants cannot [511] be analyzed (Eckstein, 1965: 140ff.) 
